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BRINGING WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINALS TO JUSTICE -
FUGITIVE APPREHENSION AND RETURN AND
OBTAINING EVIDENCE ABROAD
DAVID P. WARNER*
In an effort to begin to bring balance to what can be a perceived as an emphasis
on extradition as a primary, if not exclusive, remedy to secure fugitives'
apprehensions and returns, this comment identifies other legitimate alternatives to
bring fugitives, such as white-collar criminals, to justice.' Because obtaining
evidence abroad often plays a determinative role once transnational white-collar
criminals face prosecution, this comment also highlights related evidentiary
concerns.
Recent prominent cases illustrate the particular complexities of bringing white-
collar fugitives to justice.2 Needless to say, financial resources play a pivotal role
in white-collar cases. 3 White-collar fugitives usually possess the resources to travel
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, move their holdings from site to site, and challenge
every law enforcement action through protracted proceedings in home countries
and/or other countries.' Often, home country proceedings focus on the legitimacy
of the accusatory document and concomitant order for arrest.' In other country
proceedings, the fundamental questions are principally whether the fugitive is
charged in the home country and whether a valid arrest warrant exists against that
fugitive on the specified charge or charges. These questions often serve as vehicles
to delay the fugitive's return to the home country.6
APPREHENSION AND RETURN
Recent events in the United States and Mexico underscore the need to apprehend
and return fugitives, especially white-collar fugitives, to the jurisdictions where they
committed their crimes to ensure that justice can ultimately be served. There are
* Mr. Warner, an attorney with the U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Division, in Washington, D.C.,
served as the Country Atach for the U.S. Department of Justice from Fall 1999 to Summer 2002 at the U.S.
Embassy in Mexico City, Mexico. Mr. Warner holds a joint degree in law and international affairs (JD/MA) from
the American University. He received a BA in International Studies from the Ohio State University and a Diploma
in Hispanic Studies from the Complutense University of Madrid. Mr. Warner also studied at the Hague Academy
of International Law. Mr. Warner has been recognized by numerous law enforcement agencies for his efforts to
promote cooperation to combat transnational crime and has presented at multiple national and international
conferences and seminars to address international law enforcement issues. Mr. Warner appeared at the conference
in his personal capacity, and therefore the observations that he made reflect only his personal opinion and do not
necessarily reflect the position of the U.S. Department of Justice or the U.S. Government.
1. See e.g, Bruce Zagaris and Julia Padierna Peralta, The Evolution of Mexico- United States Extraditions
and Alternatives: From Fugitive Slaves to Drug Traffickers - 150 Years and Beyond the Rio Grande's Winding
Courses, 12 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POLICY 519, 531-33, 613-21 (1997) (hereinafter Zagaris & Padierna]. The U.S.
Attorneys' Manual identifies alternatives to bring fugitives Injustice, including extradition. See USAM, infra note
7, § 9-15.000 (introducing issues concerning international extradition and related matters).
2. See, e.g., Prominent Political Fugitives Oscar Espinosa [Villarreal] and Carlos Cabal Peniche Drop
Efforts to Block Extradition to Mexico, SourceMex (Aug. 15, 2001) (on file with author). Cabal Peniche fought
extradition from Australia and Espinosa Villarreal fought extradition (and attempted to seek asylum) from
Nicaragua. These are just two recent white-collar criminal cases that received significant media attention in Mexico.
3. Costs appear to exceed thousands, if not tens or hundreds of thousands, of dollars.
4. Proceedings can extend for months, if not years. See Espinosa Villarreal and Cabal Peniche, supra note
2, at 1-2.
5. See id
6. Id.
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multiple approaches to apprehend and return white-collar fugitives.' Extradition
may be the most familiar alternative to obtain fugitives' apprehensions and returns.8
However, other lawful measures, often more expeditious, should be considered.
Because white-collar fugitives usually have money and travel to avoid
apprehension, the first approach focuses on travel documents. One remedy is to
limit a fugitive's ability to travel. This administrative remedy may require the
executive authorities of a requesting country to work directly with their counterparts
of the requested country to terminate a travel authorization, such as a visa; or, in the
case of the United States and Mexico, to cancel a border-crossing card. 9 These
actions are unlikely to lead to the individual's immediate apprehension, but have the
obvious advantages of affirmatively limiting the individual's geographic mobility
and providing a cooperative basis to attack the issue frontally. If necessary,
appropriate ancillary measures, such as surveillance, can mitigate the risk of flight
as well.'0
Denying or revoking an individual's passport is another administrative option."
However, passport denial or revocation is not a practice embraced by some
countries. Countries that disfavor the practice tend to do so based on the underlying
belief that a passport is intricately linked with nationality and is considered
fundamental to an individual's identity.' 2 Adopting the view that a passport is a
travel document - and only a travel document - permits countries to employ an
additional tool to combat transnational crime.' 3 Preserving this premise in statute
would establish an appropriate legal foundation to ensure that, for instance, Mexican
7. See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL [hereinafter USAM] § 9-15.600-650 (1997)
(identifying alternatives to extradition, such as immigration removals and lures), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usaoteousalfoia-reading-roomusam/title9/15mcrm.htm#9-15.600 (last visited Mar. 29,
2003).
8. See Zagaris & Padierna, supra note I, at 531-33, 613-21 (focusing principally on the extradition
relationship between the U.S. and Mexico, noting a trend of an increasing number of extraditions between the two
countries, and advocating efforts to strengthen extradition between the two countries).
9. See Revocation of Visas, 22 C.F.R. § 41.122 (2003) (providing for cancellation and revocation of travel
documents, including border crossing cards); see also Nonresident Alien Mexican Border Crossing Identification
Cards; Combined Border Crossing Identification Cards and B-I/B-2 VisitorVisas, 22 C.F.R. § 41.32 (2003) (setting
forth criteria for issuance and revocation of a border crossing card for Mexican citizens and residents).
10. Accredited liaison agents of the U.S. often work with host country counterparts to advance appropriate
ancillary measures. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, for instance, has agents accredited in more than 40 offices
overseas and recently petitioned Congress to increase that number. See FBI Planning to Add Offices Overseas,
WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 2003, at A13. The Drug Enforcement Administration also has agents accredited to U.S.
Missions abroad, along with the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the Bureau of Customs and
Border Protection of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (formerly the Imnigration and Naturalization
Service and the U.S. Customs Service).
11. USAM, supra note 7, § 9-15.640. See also Denial of Passports, 22 C.F.R. § 51.70 (2003) (establishing
criteria to deny passports); Revocation or Restriction of Passports, 22 C.FR. § 51.72 (2003) (setting forth provisions
to revoke or restrict passports).
12. This position became a point of discussion on a number of cases while serving as Country Attach6 to
the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City. On occasion, revocation of a passport could have ensured a fugitive's inability
to depart Mexico City. Mexican law, however, reportedly does not contemplate revocation, nor did officials appear
receptive to advance legislation to that effect. Compare Ley de Nacionalidad [Nationality Law] art. 3(IV)
(identifying passport as proof of Mexican nationality) and Reglamento de Pasaportes [Passport Regulation] art. 8
(underscoring that anyone of Mexican nationality can obtain a regular passport) with id. art. 3 (acknowledging that
a passport can be confiscated or canceled for failure to comply with application requirements).
13. Accordingly, countries may wish to consider legislation to this effect. Denying or revoking the passport
of prominent white-collar fugitives, such as Espinosa Villarreal and Cabal Peniche, may have empowered Mexican
justice rather than permitted the fugitives to exploit two legal systems.
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national fugitives in possession of a Mexican passport, who enter a Mexican
consulate for particular services, could find themselves returning to their home
country to face justice. Absent this mechanism, officials are often faced with more
taxing measures, such as immigration removal or extradition, executive/judicial
measures that often generate significant public disclosure and force the requesting
state to expose aspects of a case prematurely. 4
Where travel document cancellation or passport denial or revocation proves
ineffective, fugitive removal through immigration proceedings (often captioned
"exclusion/deportation" or simply "removal") can advance a white-collar criminal's
apprehension and return to his or her home country. Immigration laws of the
requested country provide legal justification for this action. 5  Often, the
immigration action is grounded in the requesting country's disclosure of a charging
document and accompanying order for arrest. As a general rule, removal through
the immigration process is often more expeditious than extradition and affords the
requesting state a greater degree of leverage to apply the fullest extent of the law. 6
Generally, the question is not whether the fugitive's return is achieved, but rather
when the fugitive's return occurs. 7 However, removal through immigration
proceedings cannot apply against nationals of the requested state, nor as a matter of
practice will the requested state initiate this process against an individual who has
or may have a claim of nationality in the requested state.'8
14. Supporting documents generally accompany a request for expulsion, deportation, and especially
extradition. Prosecutors are placed in the delicate position of disclosing no more than necessary to meet the
requested country's legal standards of something tantamount to probable cause - and nothing more - so that the
defendant does not know the government's entire case pre-trial. Lost in efforts to advance extradition at the expense
of other legitimate means for a fugitive's return is the aggrieved community's desire to obtain justice. While
governments are reminded of the need to protect the fugitive's legal rights, tactics to promote premature disclosure,
predicated on claims of fundamental fairness, frustrate attempts to ensure that justice is sought in the jurisdiction
where the crime was committed. See infra note 53 (noting growing emphasis on intersection between extradition
proceedings and human rights and fundamental freedoms).
15. Article 37(V) of Mexico's Ley General de Poblacidn [L.G.P.][General Population Law], for instance,
permits immigration officials to revoke an individual's immigration status for the existence of"adverse antecedents"
("nialos antecedentes"). The existence of an outstanding arrest warrant has been selectively considered an adverse
antecedent. The Secretarfa de Gobemaci6n [Secretariat for the Interior] is responsible for suspending or prohibiting
the entry of foreign nationals into Mexico. See L.G.P. art. 38.
16. An immigration expulsion, for instance, can take place within hours, if all logistics are addressed,
because the fugitive can depart the asylum country on the next immediate flight to the country from which s/he
came. Indeed, Article 33 of the Mexican Constitution grants the Mexican President the exclusive authority to
remove immediately and without process any foreigner whom he or she determines to be unwelcome
("inconveniente"). MEX. CONST. art. 33.
17. See Espinosa Villarreal and Cabal Peniche, supra note 2, at 1-2.
18. Nationals are not subject to the expulsion, deportation, and removal laws of their home country. Some
governments, such as Mexico, interpret their nationality law broadly so that an individual born in the U.S. to U.S.
parent(s) of Mexican lineage, where the U.S. citizen did not speak Spanish, had voted in the U.S., and served in U.S.
armed forces, could still claim Mexican citizenship or have one asserted on his or her behalf. See MEX. CONST. art.
30 (establishing criteria for acquisition of Mexican nationality); Ley Orginica de la Administraci6n Pdblica
[Organic Law for Public Administration] art. 28(11) (noting that the Secretarfa de Relaciones Exteriores [Secretariat
of Foreign Relations] is empowered take actions to safeguard Mexicans); see also Reglamento para la Expedici6n
de Certificados de Nacionalidad Mexicana [Regulation for Issuing Mexican Nationality Certificates] (establishing
framework to solicit proof of Mexican nationality before the Secretariat of Foreign Relations). But cf MEx. CONST.
art. 38(V) (noting that rights and privileges of a Mexican citizen are qualified, especially if the individual is a
fugitive from justice); Nationality Law art. 6 (creating a presumption that a Mexican has acquired another
nationality if the Mexican cormits a legal act to acquire or preserve or affirm that nationality before a legal
authority or in a public document),
Spring 20031
U.S.-MEXICO LAW JOURNAL
Often instrumental in advancing the immigration process is an Interpol fugitive
diffusion or red notice.' 9 Interpol is an intergovernmental organization dedicated to
disseminating police information among its member states.20 Its constitution in part
explains that the mission of Interpol is to ensure and promote the widest possible
mutual assistance between criminal police authorities within the limits of the laws
existing in the different countries and in the spirit of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.2 1 The mission is accomplished through an information exchange
network of the national central bureaus of each of the member countries. Apart
from laying a legal foundation for an immigration action, notice of a fugitive
diffusion or red notice in a country where the fugitive is found can also serve as the
predicate for an arrest pursuant to a pending extradition request or provisional arrest
request.23
Extradition is another approach to advance white-collar criminal apprehension
and return.24 Extradition is the mechanism by which a requested country will
surrender an accused or convicted individual to stand trial or face punishment in a
requesting country.2 The legal basis, with very limited exception, is grounded on
a bilateral or multilateral treaty. Depending on particular bilateral relationships,
extradition is often perceived as the least effective means to bring a fugitive to
justice, especially a white-collar fugitive.26 As between the United States and
Mexico, an extradition request can occur once treaty requirements have been met. 7
The request, received and acknowledged in the requested state, can serve as the
predicate to apprehend the fugitive in the requested country, or if a person is in
custody in the requested state and serving time for having been definitively judged
and sentenced, a recently enacted protocol to the U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty
can permit the temporary surrender of a fugitive to the requesting country under
specific circumstances.2 Challenges are certainly common in the extradition
19. The diffusion or red notice is also referred to as an international all-points-bulletin. Its dissemination
alerts law enforcement officials of other countries to an individual's criminal status.
20. See INTERPOLat http://www.interpol.int (last visited Mar. 29, 2003). Membership in the international
criminal police organization numbers approximately 180 countries, including the U.S. and Mexico. See also 22
U.S.C. § 263a (authorizing Attorney General "to accept and maintain, on behalf of the United States, membership
in the International Criminal Police Organization").
21. id.
22. See id.
23. The domestic laws of some countries permit host country officials to act directly on the Interpol
diffusion. In the U.S., law enforcement officials must seek a warrant, unless another legitimate basis, such as an
immigration hold, is available.
24. See USAM, supra note 7, § 9-15.100-500.
25. See Geoff Gilbert, Aspects of Extradition Law (Dordrecht, The Netherlands) (1991).
26. A review of the bilateral extradition relationship between the U.S. and Mexico demonstrates that few
white-collar criminals are extradited between the two countries. See Justice Official Testifies on U.S.-Mex.
Counter-Drug Efforts Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Res. of the House Comm.
on Gov't Reform, 106th Cong. 3140 (2000) (statement of Dep. Ass't Att'y Gen. Mary Lee Warren), available at
http:lusinfo.state.gov/regionallarlmexico/mxdrg3.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2003).
27. See Extradition Treaty Between the United States and Mexico, May 4, 1978, art. 10, 31 U.S.T. 5059.
[hereinafter U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treatyl; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (empowering U.S. authorities to execute
requests); Ley de Extradici6n Intemacional [International Extradition Law] arts. 17, 21 (providing that the
Secretariat of Foreign Relations determines whether sufficient legal bases, or "fundamentos," exist to advance and
execute a request).
28. See Protocol to Extradition Treaty Between the United States and Mexico, Nov. 13, 1997, S. TREATY
Doc. No. 105-46 (1988). The Protocol entered into force in May 2001, after the U.S. and Mexico exchanged the
instruments of ratification during U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft's first visit to Mexico to meet with Mexican
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context, and the relationship between the United States and Mexico has recently
been plagued with issues that hinder extradition. 9
White-collar offenses as prescribed in various countries often do not mirror each
other by content and elements, necessitating particular scrutiny of the underlying
facts and circumstances alleged in a specific request.30 Without establishing dual
criminality, the requested country is generally precluded from any treaty action."
Because Article 7 of the U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty provides that "extradition
shall not be granted when the prosecution or the enforcement of a penalty for the
offense for which extradition has been sought has become barred by lapse of time
according to the laws of the requesting or requested Party, ' 32 the statute of
limitations for the particular white-collar offense may frustrate the advancement of
a particular request.33  White-collar criminals will often claim political animus by
the requesting country, and, interestingly enough, at the same time publicly declare
confidence in the requesting state's judicial system.34  An effect of these
discrepancies can be that while representatives from both countries work closely to
overcome issues, justice appears stalled - and impunity seems prolonged -until the
fugitive's apprehension is ensured.
To address this latter issue, a requesting country can solicit the fugitive's
provisional arrest if permitted under the terms of the extradition treaty.35 Article 11
Attorney General Rafael Macedo de la Concha. See A Principios del Mes de Marzo de Este A/o, Durante Su Visita
a los Estados Unidos de Amirica, el Procurador Rafael Macedo de la Concha, Extendid una lnviracibn a!
Procurador General de Ese Pals, John D. Ashcroft, para Visitar a Mixico, Boletfn 330/01 de la Procuradurfa
General de la Repdiblica (May 21, 2001), available at http:llwww.pgr.gob.mx/cmsocial/bolOl/may/b33001.html
(last visited Mar. 29, 2003).
29. See Alejandro Gutierrez and Ricardo Ravelo, Mediante amparos, los capos del narcotrafico empiezan
a frustrar el comproniso de Mexico con Estados Unidos de extraditarlos, PROCESO, No. 1319, Feb. 10, 2002, at
16-19; see also U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT V-I, V-34-35
(2003) [hereinafter INCSRJ (focusing on efforts of Mexico, among other countries, to combat drug trafficking in
2002), available at http:lfwww.statw.govldocumentslorganization(18170.pdf (last visited Apr. 24.2003).
30. See U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 27, art. 2. As opposed to previous list provisions, dual
criminality is a standard requirement to advance an individual's return through extradition.
31. U.S. law, for instance, imposes the requirement of specific intent, which must be affirmatively
established. The prosecution can meet this burden by relying on multiple forms of evidence, including
circumstantial evidence. Many Mexican white-collar crimes imply intent or permit inference, something more akin
to a strict liability theory. See, e.g., C6digo Penal Federal [C.P.F.] [Federal Penal Code] art. 400 his (establishing
a presumption of culpability for goods or resources whose legitimate origin cannot be established - "no pueda
acreditarse su legitima procedencia"). While the underlying facts of a Mexican case may in fact demonstrate
specific intent on further analysis, supporting documents on their face must demonstrate that the treaty requirements
of dual criminality and the legal standard to prosecute in the requested country are met. U.S. documents face similar
scrutiny in requests to Mexico.
32. U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 27, art. 7.
33. White-collar criminals tend to face less severe sentences in Mexico, and the statute of limitations
generally runs more quickly for these kinds of crimes in Mexico than for similar crimes in the U.S. So a three-year
statute of limitations under Mexican law would preclude advancement of a request if in fact a U.S. charging
document was filed, for example, four years after the illicit act.
34. See Espinosa Villarreal and Cabal Peniche, supra note 2, at 1-2.
35. Provisional arrest is an extraordinary detention mechanism to ensure an international fugitive's
apprehension. See U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 27, art. II; 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (authorizing issuance
of warrant); id. § 3187 (noting a provisional arrest and detention in the U.S. can run up to 90 days); USAM, supra
note 7, § 9-15.230 (referencing provisional arrest); see also Martin v. Warden, 993 F.2d 824, 828-29 (11 th Cir.
1993) (noting no right to speedy trial in extradition cases). Conpare U.S. v. Wiebe, 733 F.2d 549, 553-54 (8th Cir.
1984) (articulating minimum standards to obtain arrest warrant for provisional arrest) with Parretti v. U.S., 122 F.3d
758, 773 (9th Cir. 1998), op. withdrawn en banc, 143 F.3d 508 (9th Cir. 1998) (questioning standard to obtain
provisional arrest warrant).
Spring 2003]
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of the U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty provides that "in the case of urgency, either
Contracting Party may request, through diplomatic channels, the provisional arrest
of an accused or convicted person. 36 The application shall contain "a description
of the person sought and his whereabouts, an undertaking to formalize the request
for extradition, and a declaration of the existence of a warrant of arrest issued by a
competent judicial authority or a judgment of conviction issued against the person
sought."-31 "On receipt of such a request, the requested party shall take the necessary
steps to secure the arrest of the person claimed. '38  "Provisional arrest shall be
terminated if, within a period of sixty days after the apprehension of the person
claimed, the executive authority of the requested party has not received the formal
request for extradition of the documents mentioned in [the previous Article]. 39
The obvious advantage of seeking and executing a provisional arrest is that the
white-collar criminal is taken into custody and no longer a flight risk, unless a bail
exception can apply.40 Disadvantages mirror those noted above and also include the
treaty-imposed deadline to provide supporting documents to continue the
individual's custodial status and advancement of extradition proceedings.4 In
white-collar cases, preparing the supporting documents can be particularly troubling
given the inherent complexities of an investigation and the additional need to
translate the documents.42 Additionally, challenges and protracted hearings over
periods of years are not uncommon, especially regarding white-collar fugitives.43
Finally, a requested country's own legal system may impose extra-treaty
requirements, often to comply with a constitutional norm. The Mexican
Constitution, for instance, requires that ajudge receive supporting documents within
two months,44 while the extradition treaty expressly conditions timely delivery to
Mexico's executive.45
The Mexican Supreme Court interpreted the Mexican Constitution in October
2001 to find that a prospective life sentence is unconstitutional,46 though Article 8
36. U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 27, art. 11.
37. Id.
38. Id. art. 11(2).
39. Id. art. 11(3).
40. See Wright. Henkel, 190 U S. 40,63 (1903) (explaining in seminal decision why bail is generally not
permitted in the extradition context).
41. U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 27, art. 11(3).
42. To the extent that all arguments and evidence must be evident within the supporting documents, clarity
can often be determinative in complex cases. Moreover, scores of documents, particularly financial statements, can
generate exorbitant translation fees.
43. Challenges have shown that some white-collar fugitives can return to their home country uncuffed as
a result of legal machinations in their own home country, with a court order in hand to guarantee release. See
Espinosa Villarreal and Cabal Peniche, supra note 2, at 1-2.
44. MEX. CONST. art. 119. See also "Amparo en revisi6n 5707189," 6 SEMANARIO JUDICIAL DE LA
FEDERACION [S.J.F.] 29 (8a dpoca 1990), available at http://www.scjn.gob.mx (last visited Mar. 29, 2003)
(reporting decision of Mexican Supreme Court, Tesis [Thesis] P. XLIV/90, that explains art. 119's 60 day detention
is an exception to art. 19's prohibition that detentions cannot exceed 72 hours).
45. U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 27, art. 11(3).
46. See"Contradicci6n de Tesis 11/2001," 14 S.J.F. 15 (9a Apoca 2001), available at
http://www.scjn.gob.mx (last visited Mar. 29, 2003) (declaring in Tesis [Thesis) P./J. 127/2001 that life
imprisonment is an unusual punishment forbidden under art. 22 of the Mexican Constitution because it affords the
convicted no opportunity to rehabilitate, a constitutional protection identified in art. 18). In practice, Mexican courts
routinely sentence individuals to consecutive terms of years sentences. These sentences in practice are tantamount
to life sentences. See Candenan a 500 afios de prisdn a tres involucrados en el caso Chirnalhuacdn, LA JORNADA,
Oct. 24, 2001, at 47 (reporting 500-year sentence); Decretan a taxista 82 afios de rtircel, REFORMA, Feb. 7, 2002,
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of the U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty provides that the requested state's exclusive
sentencing basis to deny an extradition is a prospective capital sentence.47 With
respect to the United States, the provisional arrest section of the extradition treaty
states that the requesting country need only present a valid warrant against a
particular fugitive, 8 while the U.S. Constitution requires that issuance of the U.S.
warrant be based on probable cause.49
Some fugitives realize that facing justice squarely may truly be their best option
and elect to forgo challenges to extradition, determining for him- or herself that
waiving the extradition process under the extradition treaty can potentially provide
the defendant, after returning to the requesting country, with benefits for having
cooperated." The fugitive will notify the court or appropriate executive official to
affirmatively request a waiver of extradition or extradition proceedings and
immediate removal from the requested country." Under this approach, a fugitive's
return can be effected expeditiously.
Common to each of these scenarios is that the requesting state is taking action so
that the fugitive returns to stand trial, be sentenced, or serve a sentence. Viewed
through the lens of pragmatism, much of taxpayers' expenses could be saved if
white-collar fugitives would voluntarily return to the requesting country. It is ironic
to hear white-collar fugitives publicly espouse the integrity of their home country's
judicial system, yet insist on challenging their return, preemptively exposing
themselves to the requested state's judicial system. 2 While challenging extradition
proceedings conforms to the laws of the requested state and international law and
practice," as well as affords the fugitive all the protections under the laws of the
at 2B (reporting 82-year sentence). In fact, death during a kidnapping can result in a 70-year sentence. See C.P.F
art. 366(111).
47. Article 8 of the extradition treaty states: "When the offense for which extradition is requested is
punishable by death under the laws of the requesting Party and the laws of the requested Party do not permit such
punishment for that offense, extradition may be refused unless the requesting Party furnishes such assurances as
the requested Party considers sufficient that the death penalty shall not be imposed, or, if imposed, shall not be
executed." U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 27, art. 8.
The October 2001 decision in effect undercut the strength of the January 2001 Mexican Supreme Court decision
that affirmed the Executive's absolute discretion to extradite Mexican nationals. See MINISTRO PRESIDENTE
GENARO DAVID GONGORA PIMENTAL, SUPREMA CORTE DE JUSTICIA DE LA NACION, TERCER INFORME ANUAL DE
LABORES, Dec. 14, 2001, at 15. Everardo Arturo Pez Martinez, a member of the Arellano-Felix drug trafficking
organization, was the first Mexican national to be extradited under that ruling. See Everardo Arturo Pdez Marinez,
alias "Kitti ". "El Morro ", "El Peldn " y "Cuarenta ". Uno de los Miembros Mds Inportantes del Cartel de los
Arellano Flix, Fue Entregado en Extradicin al Gobierno de los Estados Unidos de Amtrica, Boletfn 287/01 de
Ia Procuradurfa Federal de Ia Reptblica (May 4, 2001), available at
http://www.pgr.gob.mxlcmsocialibo01/may/b287Ol html (last visited Mar. 29, 2003). Though select lower courts
sought to revive the "exceptional case" standard set forth in Article 14 of the International Extradition Law, the
Government of Mexico, as a matter of practice is extraditing Mexican nationals- See INCSR, supra note 29, at V-
34-35.
48. U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 27, art. 11.
49. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
50. Critieis argue that no fugitive will knowingly cooperate and return to face justice. Cf INCSR, supra
note 29, at V-34 (reporting that fugitives waived extradition in 2002).
51. See U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 27, art. 18. In the U.S., a fugitive can file a formal
request to waive extradition or seek summary extradition before the magistrate or district court judge, depending
on the jurisdiction in question, who then makes an on-the-record finding of a knowing and voluntary waiver. In
Mexico, a fugitive's written request to the Mexican court or appropriate Mexican authorities of the Foreign Ministry
can lead to a fugitive's summary extradition.
52. See Espinosa Villarreal and Cabal Peniche, supra note 2, at 1-2; supra text accompanying note 3.
53. A plethora of publications underscores efforts to ensure human rights and fundamental freedoms in
Spring 2003]
U.S.MEXICO LAW JOURNAL
requested country, the result is generally the same: the fugitive returns to the
requesting country to face justice.5 4 Legal machinations, particularly in high-profile
white-collar cases, do little to serve the public at large and, depending on the degree
of publicity, can adversely impact the integrity of the court.
A final issue to address is prosecution in a home country pursuant to the country's
domestic law for illicit acts performed outside the home country. 5" Except in very
limited circumstances, the United States lacks this legal option. Mexico, however,
possesses it. Mexico has a provision under Article 4 of its Federal Penal Code that
permits the prosecution in Mexico for crimes that are committed outside Mexico.
Article 4 requires that the fugitive be a Mexican national or an individual who
victimized a Mexican national, be found in Mexico, and not have been definitively
judged in the country where the crime was committed. The crime committed abroad
must also be a federal crime in Mexico. 56 White-collar crimes, such as tax evasion,
generic and specific frauds, and public corruption, generally meet this dual
criminality requirement. Accordingly, Mexican nationals who commit crimes
outside Mexico or anyone who commits crimes against Mexican nationals outside
Mexico can potentially find themselves standing trial in Mexico for those crimes.
Domestic prosecution in Mexico for crimes committed outside Mexico can be
initiated in two ways. The first is by directly filing a formal complaint along with
supporting documents against the alleged criminal in Mexico, or in the Mexican
Embassy or one of its consulates if the prosecutor is outside Mexico. The second
way is by indirect action, one that arises pursuant to Article 9 of the Extradition
Treaty, when the Mexican executive elects to deny an extradition based on Mexican
nationality.57 In practice, this means that a white-collar criminal who is a Mexican
national or who victimized a Mexican national or nationals should not be able to use
Mexico as a haven for his or her actions abroad. The number of white-collar cases
prosecuted under this legal provision has been few, but in light of Mexican court
rulings opposing extradition, the number should increase in the near future.
OBTAINING EVIDENCE ABROAD
Criminals, including white-collar criminals, neither respect nor observe
international borders. Practically, that means that evidence required in one
extradition proceedings. See, e.g., Ann Powers, Justice Denied? The Adjudication of Extradition Applications, 37
TEX. INT'L L.J. 272, 291 (2002). This comment principally focuses on legitimate alternatives to ensure fugitive
apprehension and returns. The intersection between those alternatives and human fights were beyond the scope of
the presentation.
54. See Espinosa Villarreal and Cabal Peniche, supra note 2, at 1-2.
55. See generally USAM, supra note 7, § 9-15.650.
56. Article 4 of the Mexican Federal Penal Code states: "Crimes committed in a foreign country, by a
Mexican citizen against Mexican citizens or against a foreign citizen, or by a foreign citizen against Mexican
citizens, shall be punishable in the Republic, in accordance with the federal laws, if the following requirements are
met: (1) That the defendant is found in the Republic; (11) The defendant must not have been definitively judged in
the country where the crime was committed, and (Il) The offense being charged must be a crime in the country in
which it was committed and in the Republic of Mexico." C.P.F. art. 4.
57. Article 9(1) of the extradition treaty states: "Neither Contracting Party shall be bound to deliver up its
own nationals, but the executive authority of the requested Party shall, if not prevented by the laws of that Party,
have the power to deliver them up if, in its discretion, it be deemed proper to do so." U.S.-Mexico Extradition
Treaty, supra note 27, art. 9(1).
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jurisdiction can exist in another. In those situations, obtaining evidence from the
other country can be challenging. 58
Traditionally, letters rogatory served as the principal vehicle to obtain documents,
public and private, from a foreign jurisdiction59 - and they still do for defendants.
Letters rogatory, court-to-court requests for assistance, are transmitted through
diplomatic channels and require action by respective foreign ministries. Obviously,
the process proved taxing and protracted for investigators and prosecutors. Thus,
governments acknowledged an acceptable alternative for their law enforcement
officials: treaties for international mutual legal assistance, commonly referred to as
MLATs (Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty), to address the need for timely collection
and delivery of testimony and documents abroad.'
In essence, a request initiated under an MLAT permits the central authority of one
country to communicate directly with the central authority of another country
outside the diplomatic process. Its immediate impact is expediency. Because the
U.S. and Mexico are both parties to an MLAT, this means that, in practice, the U.S.
Department of Justice communicates directly with the Mexican Attorney General's
Office to advance and execute specific requests.6 Requests between the U.S. and
Mexico initiated under the treaty have grown significantly since it came into force,
particularly Mexican requests to the United States.62 The U.S.-Mexico MLAT
places an affirmative obligation on parties to cooperate with each other to deal with
the prevention, investigation, and prosecution of crimes, absent the invocation of
one or more of several very narrow exceptions., 3
Article 1(4)(b) of the U.S.-Mexico MLAT addresses document collection and
general delivery of the kind of evidence on which a white-collar investigation and
58. See USAM, supra note 7, § 9-13.510-535 (identifying multiple issues concerning evidence abroad),
available at http:llwww.usdoj.govusaoleousaffoiareading.-room/usarititle9/13mcrm.htm#9-13.510.
59. See. e.g., Inter-American Convention on Letters Rogatory, Jan. 30, 1975, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 98-27
(1984), O.A.S.T.S. No. 43, available at http://www.as.org; Additional Protocol to the Inter-American Convention
on Letters Rogatory, May 8, 1979, S. TREATY Doc. No. 98-27 (1984), O.A.S.T.S. No. 56, available at
http://www.oas.org; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. §§ 442, 471,
473 (1987).
60. U.S.-Mexico Treaty on Cooperation for Mutual Legal Assistance, Dec. 19, 1987, S. TREATY Doc. No.
100-13 (1988) [hereinafter US-Mexico MLATI. Multilateral treaties also exist and obligate parties to provide
mutual legal assistance. One example is the 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Dec. 20, 1988, T.I.A.S.. 28 I.LM. 493 (1989), available at
http://www.ineb.org/cconvl1988. A regional example is the Inter-American Convention on Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters, Jan. 10, 1995, S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-25 (1997), O.A.S.T.S. No. 75, available at
http://www.oas.org.
MLATs are not an exclusive basis for cooperation between two governments in the area of white-collar crimes.
Executive agreements such as tax information exchange agreements and currency transaction information exchanges
also exist. The Treasury Department is responsible for the implementation and execution of these agreements.
Executive agreements overseen by other executive agencies also exist.
61. Direct communication may take the form of telephone calls, faxes, or face-to-face encounters. The
Country Attachd for the U.S. Department of Justice can meet with counterparts directly in Mexico City, and
Attachds of the Mexican Attorney General's Office accredited to the Mexican Mission in Washington, D.C., can
meet with U.S. Department of Justice officials in Washington, D.C.
62. While precise numbers are not immediately available, a pattern over recent years shows that for each
request the U.S, Central Authority presents to the Mexican Central Authority, the U.S. Central Authority receives
approximately 3 requests from the Mexican Central Authority. A working group comprised of representatives from
each central authority meets periodically to address specific case related concerns with the aim, among other duties,
of resolving outstanding mutual legal assistance requests.
63. See generally U.S.-Mexico MLAT, supra note 60, art. (3).
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prosecution are likely to turn." Articles 7 and 10 implement the general reference.
Specifically, they note that if the documents are certified in accordance with the
procedure specified in the request, then they shall be admissible in evidence as proof
of the truth of the matter set forth therein. 5 In short, documents can be admissible
as a hearsay exception. Both public and private documents are contemplated under
the treaty.
Responsiveness and timeliness of delivery tend to determine to what extent a
white-collar investigation and prosecution can advance. Often financial institutions
control the key documents in these kinds of cases. Domestic law controls whether
financial institution officials expose themselves to liability for surrendering
documents in an investigation and/or prosecution. Has there been a breach of
confidentiality? Does the financial institution subject itself to criminal liability? An
affirmative response to either of these questions can ensure an institution's decision
not to assist, particularly if domestic law lacks an affirmative requirement to
cooperate. The absence of subpoena authority or the presence of a limitation on
which state authority can issue a subpoena impacts an investigation and a
prosecution." For instance, direct law enforcement cooperation may generate
information that a prosecuting official requires for trial, but certification of those
documents for prosecution purposes under the treaty might be frustrated under
domestic procedural norms, particularly if the norms incorporate enforcement and
regulatory powers in the same entity.6 7 Obstacles aside, the ultimate goal remains
unchanged: providing complete and accurate responses to the requesting state under
the terms of MLAT.
Timeliness of delivery can also be pivotal in these kinds of cases. While a
response may in fact be complete and accurate, its arrival weeks or months after the
target delivery date can hinder investigative and prosecutorial efforts. To that end,
constant communication between identifiable and reliable points of contact must be
encouraged." Public servants from either country should be able to act immediately
in their own official capacity to advance particular requests for assistance.69 Both
64. U.S.-Mexico MLAT, supra note 60, art. l(4)(b).
65. Id. art. 7(5) ("If certified or authenticated in such manner, they shall be admissible in evidence as proof
of the truth of the matters set forth therein."); id. art. 10(3) (employing same language).
66. Compulsory process is not fully prescribed in many countries' laws, including Mexico's. At best,
government officials can summon or formally request, with full knowledge that the individual's refusal cannot be
punished effectively. Compare C6digo Federal de Procedimientos Penales [Federal Code of Criminal Procedure]
arts. 73-85 (empowering a Public Prosecutor to issue summons in defined circumstances); id. art. 116 (requiring
individuals to report criminal activity and cooperate to advance de oficio investigations); id. art. 125 (empowering
a Public Prosecutor to summons fact witnesses); id. art. 242 (articulating obligation to cooperate with Public
Prosecutor) with id. art. 20 (establishing no penalty for failure to ratify a statement before a Public Prosecutor); id.
arts. 42(111), 44(111) (prescribing a 36-hour arrest as a disciplinary measure for those who fail to assist Public
Prosecutors); id. art. 85 (authorizing fine of up to 10 days of minimum wage for those who fail to comply with a
court order).
67. The National Banking Commission in Mexico serves an investigatory and regulatory role. See generally
Ley de la Comisi6n Nacional Bancaria y de Valores [National Banking and Stock Commission] art. 2 (setting forth
authority to "supervise" and "regulate"), available at http:I/www.cnbv.gob.mx (last visited Mar. 29, 2003); id. art.
4 (enumerating the express authority of the Commission). These competing duties generate an inherent conflict of
interest, which an appropriate legislative initiative can remedy. Efforts to expose and remedy the conflict received
limited reception.
68. To the extent that transnational criminals do not acknowledge or respect international borders, sovereigns
must advance and maintain 24/7/365 points of contact.
69. Depending on the specific official act, government employees in the U.S. receive absolute or qualified
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countries should exercise discretion in deciding which requests to advance and
prioritizing the needs for the most important cases.
Apart from document production, the treaty also contemplates searches and
seizures,70 and mobilizing, securing, and forfeiting assets. 7' In the area of white-
collar crime, these provisions play a particularly important role because businesses,
residences, safe-deposit boxes, and computers often contain crucial information to
advance white-collar investigations and prosecutions. Invoking the provision to
mobilize, secure, and forfeit assets can frustrate white-collar criminals' intent to use
and relocate resources for further illicit ends. Consistent and frequent 24/7/365
points of contact between central authorities can play a determinative role in
ensuring that appropriate law enforcement action is immediate and certain in these
instances. Effective forfeiture laws enable governments to disrupt and dismantle
white-collar criminal enterprises, and cooperation can be subsequently rewarded
through asset sharing.
72
Given multiple variables that permit white-collar criminals to seek impunity, all
legitimate means to bring them to justice, not just extradition, should be pursued.
To the extent the illicit acts of white-collar criminals often transcend national
borders, seeking and obtaining evidence in other jurisdictions often play a
determinative role in the criminals' prospective prosecution. Mutual legal assistance
treaties become important tools to ensure that justice is served.
immunity for their official acts. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 343 (1986) (affirming principle of immunity
for official acts, particularly with aim not to impair "exercise of independent judgment"). Mexican officials
regularly noted the absence of similar safeguards under Mexican statutory or case law. Risk of personal liability
for appropriate officials impedes advancing countries' abilities to foster career public servants. On April 9, 2003,
the Government of Mexico brought into force the Ley del Servicio Profesional de Carrera en la Adminstracidn
Ptiblica Federal [Law for Career Professional Service in Federal Public Adminstration], an important step to
establish and nurture professional public servants in Mexico. See "Ley del Servicio Profesional de Carrera en la
Adminstraci6n Pdblica Federal," DIARIO OFICtAL (Primera Sees.), 10 de abril de 2003, at 44-60.
70. U.S.-Mexico MLAT, supra note 60, arts. 1(4)(c), 12.
71. Id. arts. 1(4)(d), 11.
72. Use of the Ley Federal para ]a Administracidn de Bienes Asegurados, Decomisados. y Abandonados
[Mexican Federal Law for the Administration of Seized, Forfeited, and Abandoned Goods] in practice results in few
reported forfeitures. Efforts to give full force and effect to this important law enforcement tool should be pursued.
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